

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 PEKING 0044

NODIS

HONG KONG PASS PLEASE PASS TO ASST SEC HOLBROOKE AND TO
AMB WOODCOCK

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: CH, US, TW, UR, OREP (KENNEDY, EDWARD)

SUBJ: SENATOR KENNEDY'S MEETING WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING:
TRANSCRIPT

REF: PEKING 0042

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A NEAR VARBATIM ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY AND PRC VICE PREMIER TENG
HSIAO-PING ON JANUARY 4 FROM 3:30 TO 5:00 PM. THE TEXT IS
DRAWN FROM NOTES TAKEN BY CODEL MEMBERS LAKICKI AND PARKER
BUT WAS NOT CLEARED FOR MALLY WITH CODEL PRIOR TO ITS
DEPARTURE.

TENG: YOUR FAMILY IS WELL KOWN IN THE UNITED STATES.

KENNEDY: YOU ARE VERY KIND TO RECEIVE ALL OF US.

TENG: IT IS A PLEASURE. IT IS THE FIRST VISIT FOR
ALL OF YOU?

KENNEDY: IT IS THE FIRST FOR ME.

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TENG: IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO SEE CHINA FOR YOURSELF.
WHAT AFTER ALL IS CHINA LIKE?

KENNEDY: WE SEE THAT CHINA IS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY.
OTHER PEOPLE SEE THAT CHINA IS A BIG POWER.

TENG: CHINA IS INDEED BIG IN TERMS OF ITS SIZE AND
ITS POPULATION. BUT IN OTHER SENSES CHINA IS A SMALL
COUNTRY. ONE DIFFERENCE EXISTS BETWEEN OLD CHINA AND

NEW CHINA. IN THE OLDDAYS WE WERE NOT ABLE TO FEED OURSELVES. NOW WE HAVE ENOUGH TO EAT AND TO WEAR. AS FAR AS CONDITIONS OF THE COUNTRY ARE CONCERNED, WE WANT A MORE PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT. WHEN YOU HAVE UNDERSTOOD OUR CONDITIONS IT WILL BE EASIER FOR YOU TO UNDERSTAND OUR POLITICAL ATTITUDES. THAT IS WHY I THINK IT IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO COME TO CHINA YOURSELF. YOU ARE AN INFLUENTIAL FIGURE AND I WANT TO EXPRESS A WARM WELCOME TO YOU. KENNEDY: MR. VICE PREMIER, FIRST OF ALL I MUST TELL YOU THAT WE WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW HOSPITABLE THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN THESE PAST DAYS AND TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO OUR HOSTS. AMBASSADOR HAO AND THE GROUP FROM THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAVE EXTENDED EVERY ASSISTANCE, GOOD WILL AND PATIENCE. OUR TRAVELING COMPANIONS HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY KIND AND WARM TO ALL OF US. WE APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE SOME FEATURES OF LIFE OF CHINA WHICH HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO ME.

IN OUR FEW DAYS IN PEKING, WE HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO AMBASSADOR HAO, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AND THE FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER REGARDING THE FUTURE OF OUR PEOPLES. I AM MINDFUL OF THE STRONG HISTORICAL TIES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE US. I AM MINDFUL OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC QUESTION OF SOVIET HEGEMONY. I CAME HERE IN THE BELIEF THAT THE DESTINIES OF THE TWO PEOPLES ARE CLOSELY INTER-TWINED AND I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE INTERRRUPTION OF TWO DECADES OF A STRONG AND VITAL RELATIONSHIP. I AM SURE THAT THE VICE PREMIER UNDERSTANDS MY STRONG COMMITMENT TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. I RESPECT THE PRINCIPLES STATED BY TH CHINESE GOVERNMENT ON THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN, WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I AM OPPOSED TO A TWO CHINA POLICY OR TO A ONE CHINA ONE TAIWAN POLICY OR ANY OTHER SIMILAR POLICIES. THE US MUST OBVIOUSLY MEET ITS REPSONSIBILITIES IN RESPECTING THE THREE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE CHINESE POLICY ON TAIWAN. MY OWN HOPE IS THAT IT (I.E., NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS) WILL BE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. THIS IS THE THOUGHT THAT YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR HAO DELIVERED FOR ME EARLIER. I AM SURE THAT VICE PREMIER TENG IS AWARE THAT THE PROCESS CAN BE MADE MUCH MORE QUICK, RAPID AND EXPEDITIOUS. IT CAN BE A LONGER OR MORE COMPLI-

CATED PROCESS IN THE US DEPENDING ON THE ATTITUDE
OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE.
I AM PREPARED TO WORK FOR THAT PROCESS (I.E., A
SHORTER PROCESS) IN THE US SENATE. MY QUESTION TO
THE VICE PREMIER IS WHETHER HE BELIEVES THE ACTIONS
OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL BE TO MAKE THAT PRO-
CESS MORE ACTIVE AND RAPID OR TO THE CONTRARY.
I BELIEVE SOME OF THE STEPS WHICH CAN MOVE THE PROCESS
MORE PARIDLY WOULD BE AVAILABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY,
PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY,
BECAUSE OF ITS SUPERIORITY IN THE VIEW OF THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT. THERE IS GREAT INTEREST IN THE
US TO WORK WITH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO SEE THE
SALE OF TECHNOLOGY WITH ALL INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY
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AVAILABLE. I THINK YOU WILL SEE A FURTHER DRAWING
DOWN OF US FORCES ON TAIWAN. WHAT HAS NOT BEEN LOST
AMONG THE PEOPLE OF MY STATE WAS THAT YOUR GOVERN-
MENT ALLOWED ME TO VISIT WITH THEIR RELATIVES IN
SHANGHAI AND TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT
OF THE FAMILY FOR HUMANIATARIAN REASONS. THESE ARE
ALL VERY CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE SIGNALS THAT ARE
RECEIVED IN THE US AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND THEY HELP
MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW.
AND WE RECOGNIZE OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN THE US
AND IN THE SENATE OF THE US TO MOVE THIS PROCESS FORWARD.
SO THESE TYPES OF THINGS WILL HELP MOVE THE
PROCESS FORWARD MORE RAPIDLY. I WOULD BE INTERESTED
IN THE VIEWS OF THE VICE PREMIER ON WHETHER
THRE WILL BE A DIFFICULT TIME OR PERHAPS A TIME OF
UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL REALITIES THAT EXIST IN
US-PRC RELATIONS AT THIS TIME.
TENG:ACTUALLY THE PROBLEM EXISTING BETWEEN CHINA
AND THE US IS TWOFOLD. AS FAR AS OUR BILATERAL RELA-
TIONS ARE CONCERNED THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM FOR NORMAL-
IZATION OF RELATIONS IS THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN. THIS
IS MOST IMPORTANT. WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT IN RELA-
TIONS IN CHINA AND THE US THRE ARE ALSO VIEWS ON
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ISSUES. IN 1972 THEN PRESIDENT
NIXON AND SECRETARY KISSINGER CAME TO CHINA AND
BOTH SIDES ISSUED THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. AND THEN
OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE FOUND A GREATER NUMBER OF
POINTS OF SIMILAR OPINION ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
AND WE HAVE SO STATED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS.
SPECIFICALLY THERE IS THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DEAL
WITH THE POLAR BEAR. THAT IS, WITH THE EXPANSIONSISM
OF THE POLAR BEAR AS YOU HAVE SAID RIGHT NOW. THERE

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IS THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN, WHICH IS THE MAIN ISSUE IN
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROBLEMS IS
ANOTHER MATTER. THESE TWO MATTERS ARE INTERRELATED,
BUT ARE NOT ONE AND THE SAME THING. OF COURSE WE
HOPE WE CAN PUSH FORWARD THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZA-
TION AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. OF COURSE WE HOPE THE
PROBLEM CAN BE RESOLVED AT ONCE. THAT WOULD MAKE
OUR TWO PEOPLES VERY HAPPY. WE APPRECIATE VERY
MUCH THE STATEMENT BY SEANTOR KENNEDY THAT YOU ARE
OPPOSED TO THE POLICY OF TWO CHINAS OR ONE CHINA ONE
TAIWAN. BUT THERE IS ONE THING THAT I CANNOT AGREE
WITH. NAMELY, THAT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS
DEPENDS ON THE ACTIONS OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
MADE UP ITS MIND LONG AGO.

KENNEDY: I UNDERSTAND THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ACTION IS THAT OF THE US. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS ITS POSITION AND STICKS TO ITS
PRINCIPLED POSITION. AS WE CONSIDER THE PROCESS OF
NORMALIZATION IN SOME OF THE VICE PREMIER' STATE-
MENTS AND IN COMMENTS BY OTHER CHINESE LEADERS, THESE
WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON THE CONTENT AND
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COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES IN THE POLICY PROCESS IN THE US.
IF I WERE ABLE TO GO BACK TO MY CONSTITUTENT S AND TO

THE US SENATE AND TO SAY THAT I WAS COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT PEOPLE IN TAIWAN WOULD BE ABLE TO LIVE IN PEACE AND PROSPERITY, THAT WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON AMERICAN OPINION.

TENG: THIS IS AN OLD QUESTION. WE HAVE STATED THE THREE CONDITION FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, NAMELY: (1) SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN; (2) ABROGATION OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN; AND (3) WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS FROM TAIWAN. IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT THE US IS DRAWING DOWN ITS TROOPS AND REDUCING THEM TO A SYMBOLIC PRESENCE. AS FOR THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, WOULD THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE? SO IN FACT, IT IS SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH IS CRUCIAL. AS FOR SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, CHINA HAS STATED THAT IT WILL AGREE TO THE JAPANESE FORMULA. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? YOU SHOULD BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. YOU SHOULDN'T HAVE ANY CONTACT BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS BUT YOU CAN HAVE NON-GOVERNMENTAL EXCHANGES AND TRADE. WHEN MR. VANCE VISITED CHINA LAST YEAR WE DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION AND HE SAID HE AGREED WITH THE THREE CONDITIONS AND WOULD UPHOLD THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. BUT HE PROPOSED A US GOVERNMENT AGENCY ON TAIWAN BY WHATEVER NAME. SO THIS IS THE KEY QUESTION. ONE OTHER POINT HE RAISED WAS THAT THE US GOVERNMENT COULD AGREE TO THE THREE CONDITIONS WHILE NOT ESTABLISHING A GOVERNMENT AGENCY ON TAIWAN BUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD COMMIT ITSELF NOT TO SOLVE THE TAIWAN ISSUE BY FORCE. WE MADE VERY CLEAR OUR POSITION

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AND ATTITUDE ON THIS ISSUE IN THE PAST. WE STATED THE SAME POSITION TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY KISSINGER, TO PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER, AND TO MR. VANCE. THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN INVOLVES SOVEREIGNTY. THERE ARE NO TERMS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON MATTERS OF SOVEREIGNTY. IN THIS REGARD WE DO NOT AGREE TO THE STATEMENT OF SOME FRIENDS THAT CHINA HAS SHOWN FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE. THERE IS NO FLEXIBILITY WHATSOEVER. SOVEREIGNTY IS VERY SERIOUS. THERE IS NO ROOM FOR FLEXIBILITY. IF FLEXIBILITY IS TO BE SPECIFIED, THERE IS THE JAPANESE FORMULA. THE OTHER FLEXIBILITY IS THAT IF THE US NEEDS TAIWAN NOW, WE CAN WAIT. SOME HAVE BEEN VERY FRANK IN THIS MATTER. AS FOR THE COMMITMENT NOT TO SETTLE THE TAIWAN PROBLEM BY FORCE, THAT CHINA IS ASKED TO UNDERTAKE, WE SAY AS TO HOW AND WHEN WE LIBERATE TAIWAN, IT IS CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. IN

MY TALK WITH JOURNALISTS FROM THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
I TOLD THEM THAT CHINA COULD NOT POSSIBLY UNDERTAKE
A COMMITMENT ON THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE CHINESE
PEOPLE. BUT I TOLD THEM THAT CHINA WOULD TAKE NOTE
OF PARTICULAR CONDITIONS IN TAIWAN IN SETTling THIS
ISSUE. THE PROPOSAL BROUGHT TO CHINA BY MR. VANCE
LAST AUGUST CANNOT WORK. WE ARE MERELY RESTATING
OUR POSITION AND MAKING IT CLEAR TO YOU. AS TO
WHEN THE US MAKES UP ITS MIND, IT IS EASY TO SETTLE
THIS QUESTION. WE CAN WAIT IF THE US NEEDS SOME
MORE TIME.

KENNEDY: I RESPECT AND I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION.
THERE ARE POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS IN THE US AS TO MOVING
THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION FORWARD AND THERE ARE
PROBLEMS FOR THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE US.
AS A BRAVE AND EFFECTIVE FORMER SOLDIER, THE VICE
PREMIER UNDERSTANDS THE FORCES AT WORK ON THE CHINA
QUESTION WITHIN THE US. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, SOME IN
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THE US BELIEVE THAT SOME IN TAIWAN WERE OUR ALLIES
DURING WORLD WAR II AGAINST THE JAPANESE

TENG: THESE PEOPLE NOW ON TAIWAN SIMPLY RETREATED
IN THE FACE OF JAPANESE AGGRESSION. IT WAS AFTER
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOGUS WANG CHI-WIE GOVERN-
MENT AND AFTER CHIANG KAI-SHEK BECAME PRESIDENT OF
THE BOGUS GOVERNMENT IN NANKING THAT CHIANG FOLLOWED
A POLICY OF NON-RESISTANCE TOWARD THE JAPANESE. AND
ON THIS POINT WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO HIM. HE GAVE
UP OVER 70 PERCENT OF CHINA'S TERRITORY TO THE

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JAPANESE SO THAT THE 8TH ROUTE ARMY AND THE 4TH ROUTE ARMY COULD MOBILIZE 30,000 TROOPS.
KENNEDY: THAT IS WHY I SAID IT IS A PERCEPTION, NOT A FACT OR A REALITY.
TENG: THESE 30,000 TROOPS SLIPPED INTO THE AREA CONTROLLED BY CHIANG AND THEY WAGED GUERRILLA WARFARE. AFTER 8 YEARS OF RESISTANCE TO JAPAN, THESE 30,000 TROOPS TURNED INTO 1,200,000 REGULAR TROOPS. IN ADDITION TO THAT THERE WERE LARGE NUMBERS OF REGULAR MILITIA. THE CHINESE PEOPLE KNOW BEST THE ATTITUDE OF CHIANG TOWARD JAPANESE AGGRESSION. FOREIGNERS DO NOT UNDERSTAND AFFAIRS IN CHINA. AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II WHEN THE KMT AND CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY NEGOTIATED FOR PEACE, CHIANG ATTACKED OUR BASES WITH HIS SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS, THE FORMER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE JAPANESE TROOPS STATIONED IN NORTH CHINA.
KENNEDY: MANY TIMES PERCEPTIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM FACTS. I RESPECT THE FACTS AS YOU HAVE STATED THEM. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO FOUGHT AGAINST JAPAN. SOME OF THE PEOPLE NOW ON TAIWAN FOUGHT AGAINST JAPAN. PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE ON TAIWAN WILL ALSO HAVE IMPORTANT EFFECTS ON THE US POSITION IN EAST ASIA, JUST AS THE CARTER ANNOUNCEMENT ON SOUTH KOREA HAD EFFECTS ON JAPANESE AFFAIRS. CHANGE IN
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THE STATUS OF TAIWAN WILL HAVE REPERCUSSIONS WHICH MAY WELL BE REFLECTED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE POLAR BEAR.
TENG: THE RESULT WOULD BE JUST TO THE CONTRARY. IF THE USG MAKES UP ITS MIND TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS AND TO RESOLVE THE TAIWAN ISSUE ON THE BASIS OF THE THREE PRINCIPLES, THIS WOULD HAVE GOOD RESULTS FOR THE US THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND WOULD HELP YOUR EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE POLAR BEAR. THE SOVIET SOCIALIST IMPERIALISTS FEAR MOST THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THERE ARE SOME WHO RAISE THE ISSUE THAT IF THE US WITHDRAWS ITS TROOPS FROM TAIWAN, AND HAS NO TIES WITH TAIWAN EXCEPT NON-GOVERNMENTAL TIES, THE SOVIET UNION WILL FILL IN THE VACUUM. I SIMPLY DON'T BELIEVE SUCH ISSUES, AND I BELIEVE SUCH ISSUES ARE UNCALLED FOR. WE HAVE INTERESTS IN TAIWAN TOO, SO THERE IS NO NEED FOR SUCH ISSUES. SO THE QUESTION NOW INVOLVES WHETHER THE

US NEEDS TAIWAN NOW. IF IT NEEDS TAIWAN NOW, I
WILL REITERATE THAT WE WILL BE PATIENT. IN THE END
THE CHINESE PEOPLE WILL RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN.
PEOPLE OF MY AGE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SEE THE GOAL FUL-
FILLED BUT PEOPLE AT THE AGE OF CHAIRMAN HUA KUO-
FENG WILL BE ABLE TO SEE THAT. I WISH TO STATE
AGAIN THAT THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN IS BUT ONE QUESTION
IN THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. WE ARE BOTH
CONFRONTED WITH INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUES TOO.
BEFORE NORMALIZATION OCCURS, WE STILL HAVE POINTS OF
AGREEMENT ON OTHER ISSUES. WE CAN CONTINUE OUR
DISCUSSIONS. APART FROM FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSIONS, WE
ALSO HAVE EXCHANGES GOING ON BETWEEN OUR TWO SIDES.
BEFORE NORMALIZATION THESE EXCHANGES WILL BE IMPEDED
NOT ONLY FROM CHINA BUT ALSO FROM THE USG. ON THE
PART OF CHINA, WE HOLD THAT THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL
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EXCHANGES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE US SHOULD NOT EXCEED
THOSE BETWEEN CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US. AS TO THE US GOVERNMENT
POSITION, IF THERE IS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
THAT WE NEED YOU WILL NOT GIVE THIS TO US.

KENNEDY: THERE ARE SOME PARTICULAR AREAS, COMPUTERS
AND OTHERS, WHICH HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. I BELIEVE THAT
YOU WILL FIND THAT THERE WILL BE LESS RESTRICTIONS
ON PURCHASES BY CHINA. CERTAINLY IN THE US SENATE
I WILL STRONGLY URGE THE ADMINISTRATION TO EXERT
PRESSURE ON BEHALF OF REDUCING RESTRICTIONS ON SALES
TO YOU.

TENG: THE COMPUTERS YOU MENTIONED ARE ONE CASE IN
POINT. WHEN WE DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH DR.
KISSINGER HE PROPOSED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD
INTERVENE AND WOULD HELP NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS POINT.
HOW IS THIS POSSIBLE IF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT
NORMALIZED RELATIONS? ONE OTHER EXAMPLE. WE ARE
TRYING TO BUY SOMETHING FROM CERTAIN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
BUT PART OF THE TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED COMES FROM THE
US. THE US WOULD NOT AGREE TO SALE OF IT. YOU HAVE
SHARES IN LOTS OF MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN
EUROPE (LAUGHTER). SO IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THE
QUESTION OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR
TWO COUNTRIES CAN BE SETTLED ONLY IF YOU APPROACH
THIS QUESTION FROM THE POLICY POINT OF VIEW. WE
MUST ALSO LOOK AT THIS QUESTION FROM A LONG TERM
STRATEGY POINT OF VIEW. IF YOU DO THAT, THINGS WILL
DEVELOP ALONG THE DESIRED COURSE. TECHNOLOGY,
CULTURAL EXCHANGES, ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS AND SO FORTH
WILL FOLLOW FROM IT.

KENNEDY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS AN IMPORTANT

AVENUE TO PURSUE OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO NORMALIZE.
IT WILL CONTINUE BECAUSE WE CAN FIND WAYS FOR COMMON
OPPORTUNITIES TO RESIST SOVIET SOCIALIST IMPERIALISM.
I THINK IT IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT FOR THE LEADERS OF
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OUR COUNTRIES, FOR STATESMEN IN OUR NATIONS, TO FIND
COMMON APPROACHES, COMMON VIEWS, AND TO HAVE EFFECTIVE
POLICIES -- BECAUSE WE HAVE COMMON INTERESTS.
TENG: AS FAR AS THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS
CONCERNED, WE WOULD LIKE TO ADVISE YOU NOT TO ENGAGE IN

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APPEASEMENT. ONE SHOULD NOT HOPE THAT THROUGH TRADE,
SUPPLY OF FOOD GRAINS, SUPPORT OF TECHNOLOGY SALES
TO THE SOVIET UNION YOU WILL BE ABLE TO CURB SOVIET
EXPANSIONISM. I THINK PERHAPS SOME OF THESE ITEMS
WILL ONLY INFLATE SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. THE SENATOR
KNOWS THE SOVIET UNION BETTER THAN I. HOW MANY TIMES HAVE
YOU VISITED THE SOVIET UNION?
KENNEDY: JUST ONCE.
TENG: JUST ONCE? I HAVE BEEN TO THE SOVIET UNION
SEVEN TIMES. I KNOW MANY SOVIET LEADERS.
KENNEDY: I DON'T UNDERSTAND THIS WORLD APPEASEMENT.
AMBASSADOR HAO, FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG AND VICE
PREMIER ALL USE IT AND UNDERSTAND IT IN ITS HISTORICAL
MEANING, BUT IT HAS NO RELEVANCE FOR TODAY.

TENG: IN THE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II, CHAMBERLAIN, DALADIER AND PERHAPS SOME AMERICANS HAD A HAND IN APPEASEMENT. THEY HELPED HITLER AND THEY CONNIVED IN HIS EXPANSION. PERHAPS APPEASEMENT IN THE US TODAY IS CALLED THE SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE.
KENNEDY: I DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW APPEASEMENT CAN BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE OR WITH PRM 10. THE US HAS MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRENGTH AND IS PREPARED TO USE IT. THIS HAS NO RELEVANCE TO THE CHAMBERLAIN POLICY OF WORLD WAR II. THE
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SONNELFELDT DOCTRINE IS INTERESTING FOR ONE WHO FOLLOWED WEST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATO DEFENSE COMMITTEE FOR FOUR YEARS. THE SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE IS A TERM BASICALLY TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. THE SONNENFELDT DOCTRINE IS ENTIRELY IN KEEPING WITH RESISTING SOVIET IMPERIALISM WITH A STRONG NATO AND WITH RESISTING THE SOVIET UNION IN WESTERN EUROPE, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. SO THESE MATTERS DON'T HAVE ANY RELEVANCE IN TERMS OF TODAY.

TENG: IT HAS ALREADY BEEN ONE YEAR SINCE PRESIDENT CARTER ASSUMED OFFICE. ONE MIGHT DO A BALANCE SHEET OF WHAT HE HAS GAINED AND WHAT HE HAS LOST FOR THE US VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION.

KENNEDY: I THINK HISTORY IS A FAIR TEST. I SUPPORT THAT CRITERION AND THAT CHALLENGE. THE SOVIET UNION HAS SUFFERED SERIOUS REVERSALS IN AFRICA -- IN SOMALIA, THE SUDAN, MOZAMBIQUE AND THE HORN OF AFRICA. IN THE MIDDLE EAST IT HAS SUFFERED A DEFEAT IN EGYPT; THERE THE SOVIET UNION'S ONLY ALLIES ARE LIBYA AND IRAQ WHICH ARE NOT MAJOR POWERS IN THE MID EAST AREAS. AS FOR THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, THE RELIABILITY, POLITICAL AND MILITARY, IS UNCERTAIN FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT. THE WARSAW PACT TROOPS IN EASTERN EUROPE ARE UNCERTAIN IN TERMS OF THEIR FIGHTING ABILITY. THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS AND IT IS NOW BEING ACCUSED AT BELGRADE OF BASIC VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SOVIET UNION IS LESS SELF-RELIANT THAN CHINA BY ITS DEPENDENCE ON CREDITS. IT IS INCREASINGLY OBLIGATED TO WESTERN EUROPE WHERE IT MUST REPAY ITS LOANS. THEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE SEPARATED. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES ARE NO LONGER RELIABLE
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ALLIES OF THE SOVIET UNION. BASICALLY THEY
SUPPORT THE MEMBERSHIP OF THEIR COUNTRIES IN NATO.
AT THE PRESENT TIME THE US HAS 8000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS
VS. 4000 SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THE US HAS 7000
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE
MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE US AND ITS ALLIES IS UNMATCHED.
TENG: BUT THINGS DON'T STOP AT THIS POINT. THERE
WILL BE NEW EVENTS AND NEW CHANGES. THERE IS ONE
POINT WHERE I DIFFER. IN MY OPINION SOVIET MILITARY
STRENGTH HAS SURPASSED THAT OF THE US. IN STRATEGIC
WEAPONS THE SOVIET UNION HAS ACHIEVED ROUGH PARITY
WITH THE US. IN NUCLEAR STRENGTH THE SOVIET UNION
IS QUITE CLOSE TO THE US. BUT IN CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS THE SOVIET UNION IS GREATER THAN THE US AND
WESTERN EUROPE PUT TOGETHER. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT
THERE ARE INDICATORS OF SOVIET WEAKNESS THAT THE SOVIET
UNION HAS SUFFERED SOME SETBACKS IN GLOBAL STRATEGIC
DEVELOPMENT. BUT SOVIET UNION WILL NOT BE RECONCILED
TO THESE SETBACKS SO WE MUST BE ON THE ALERT. THE
SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN SOME MEASURES TO COMPENSATE
FOR ITS DEFICIENCIES INCLUDING SUPPLY OF FOOD GRAINS
BY YOU TO HELP THE SOVIET UNION SOLVE ITS DIFFICULTIES.
SO THE SOVIET UNION IS STORING FOOD GRAINS
IN PREPARATION FOR WAR. ONE OTHER SOVIET WEAKNESS
IS ITS LOW LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING OF TECHNOLOGY, AND
YOU ARE HELPING THE SOVIET UNION OVERCOME THIS
WEAKNESS. IF THE SOVIET UNION REACHES AN AGREEMENT
WITH ANOTHER COUNTRY IT WILL ALWAYS HAVE SOMETHING
TO GAIN. ONLY WHEN IT'S LOSING WILL IT REACH AN
AGREEMENT WITH YOU. SO WE INVARIABLY COUNSEL OUR
FRIENDS TO BE WATCHFUL. AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION,
WE CHERISH NO ILLUSIONS.
KENNEDY: IT WAS VERY KIND OF YOU TO RECEIVE US.
SINCERELY, WHEN I RETURN TO THE US I WILL URGE THE
PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION AND WILL TRY TO FIND WAYS TO
MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD.
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PAGE 04 PEKING 00044 04 OF 04 052241Z

(THE MEETING CLOSED AFTER FURTHER AMENITIES.)

2. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO TRANSMIT THE ABOVE TO
EMBASSY MOSCOW AND EMBASSY TOKYO.

3. FOR HONG KONG: CODEL MEMBER KALICKI WOULD
APPRECIATE HAVING COPY OF THIS TRANSCRIPT AND THAT SENT IN
PEKING 0026 ON ARRIVAL IN HONG KONG.
DEAN

NOTE: UPGRADED TO NODIS PER STATE 001096

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NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHMENT, TEXT, CAT-B, MEETING REPORTS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978PEKING00044
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: HONG KONG PASS PLEASE PASS TO ASST SEC HOLBROOKE AND TO AMB WOODCOCK
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780008-0268
Format: TEL
From: PEKING
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780196/aaaaddih.tel
Line Count: 602
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: accf8be6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 11
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Reference: 78 PEKING 42
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10 feb 2005
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Review Exemptions: n/a
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3824431
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SENATOR KENNEDY'S MEETING WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING: TRANSCRIPT
TAGS: OREP, PDIP, CH, US, TW, UR, (KENNEDY, EDWARD M), (KENNEDY, EDWARD), (TENG HSIAO-PING)
To: STATE HONG KONG
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/accf8be6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
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EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
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